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ABSTRACT 
This paper uses an overlapping generation model to examine how individual 
choices and welfare are affected with the implementation of a fully funded pension plan. 
First, I consider the case when the pension is not available and sets this result as a 
benchmark. I then examine how a uniform pension benefit financed with a flat income 
tax affects individual behaviour across households that differ in their skill and their 
preference for leisure. The computational results show that the pension program leads to 
a distortion in labour supply and generally reduces the level of welfare for all types of 
individuals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper uses an overlapping generation model to compute the economic and 
welfare impact of a tax-financed pension plan in an economy consisting of 
heterogeneous individuals. When the pension is financed by a flat income tax, it shows 
this program distorts individual's labour supply decisions and leads to deadweight 
losses. The higher pension financed by the higher tax rate only brings the lower labour 
supply and the worse social welfare. Surprisingly, no one benefits from this pension 
program, even at the lower end of the income distribution. Consequently, this study 
reveals some doubts concerning this pension programs' efficacy in improving social 
welfare. 
This paper will be structured as follows: section 2 describes the model and 
provides equations that reflect the equilibrium labour supply and utility. Section 3 
discusses the calibration of the parameters within the model to some realistic values 
based on previous studies. Section 4 provides the results of the model using output from 
GAUSS. Section 5 concludes the main implication of the results presented in this study. 
MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS: 
This paper employs a life cycle model over three time periods to estimate the 
quantitative impact on the individual labour supply and utility different pension 
program. 
The individual maximizes utility over two time-dated goods, consumption and 
leisure over three time periods. Preferences are represented with the following utility 
function: 
where i= L,M,H denotes household type. 
In the first period, "young" from age of 20 to 40, the individual works in full time 
and supplies elastic labour. In the second period, from 40 to 60, considering the cost, the 
individual makes a decision regarding working or retiring earlier. In the third period, 
"old" from 60 to 80, retirement is possible. 
Where cti is the consumption in period t (t=1,2, and 3), lti is the leisure in period 
t. This study divides individuals into three types: the low, the intermediate, and the high 
skilled person, who is the high school dropout, the high school grad and the college 
grad. They have assorted wage levels consistent with their working abilities. The 
subscript i =L, M, and H placed on these variables refer to its three possible values: low, 
medium, and high. Households also have different preferences for consumption and 
leisure. The parameter 9 represents the individual's preference for leisure over 
consumption. Higher value of p represents a higher weight being place on leisure 
relative to consumption. 
As is standard, assume that U'>O and U"<O. Individuals can choose to allocate 
their fixed amount of time to work or leisure. P is the discount factor. Note that work 
refers to a participation in the paid labour market and leisure alludes to any other 
activities, such as homemaker, labour market search, etc. Individuals are endowed with 
an amount of time equal to 1. 
To make the question more focused, this study assumes tax exists both in the first 
and second periods. As well it introduces the private saving decision. When individuals 
are in middle age, they have higher wage rate than young age. 
The regular retirement pension refers to the old age pension in the third period 
when workers are assumed to be too old to work. 
2.1 Behaviour in the Absence of Pensions 
2.1.1 Consumption and leisure in three periods 
2.1.1.1 First period: 
In the first period, everyone needs to work full time. 
Consumption is: c I r . = wi.nli - S, (2) 
Here, s, is the saving in first period and wi is the wage rate for each type i. qi is 
the labour supply in the first period. i = L, M, H. 
The time constraint is: qi + I , i  = 1 
Equation (5) implies that the individual divides his time into work and leisure in 
the first period. 1,; is the leisure for each type i. 
2.1.1.2 Second period: 
During the second period, consumption in the second period is: 
Here, r is the real interest rate, and S ,  is savings in the second period. A equals 
to 1.5, which implies that the individual in his middle age has a real wage that is 50% 
higher than when young. The time constraint is: 
2.1.1.3 Third period: 
In the third period, all individuals retire and get the regular old age pension (RP) 
from the government, and individual consumption equals savings; that is: 
c~~ = s2 (1 + r )  (6) 
Now he retires, therefore: = 1 (7) 
2.1.1.4 Individual Choice Problem 
If the individual continues working, we can combine equations (2),(3),(4), (5), (6), 
(7), (8) into (I), so that the choice problem is given by: 
i=L, M, and H. (10) 
Then maximize this above equation with respect to nli , nZi sli , sZi, to yield the 
representative agent's labour supply function. The first order condition of this 
maximization exercise are: 
With respect to n,i : 
With respect to nZi :
With respect to sIi : 
With respect to sZi 
Assume that (1 + r ) p  = 1. This implicitly means, when optimal, 
The solutions to this system of equations describe equilibrium labour supply and 
individual saving behaviour. With the solution obtained, we can construct the indirect 
utility function: 
2.2 Government Pension Plan 
In this regime, all equations and calculating procedures are similar to the no tax 
regime except adding the wage tax rate z and a lump-sum pension payment RP. 
2.2.1 Consumption and leisure in three periods: 
2.2.1.1 First period: 
In the first period, consumption is: 
Where z is a distortionary wage tax rate. 
The time constraint is: n,,  + = 1 
2.2.1.2 Second period: 
During the second period, if the individual contmues working, consumption is: 
c , ~  = Aw,n,, (1 - z) + s, (1 + r) - s, (13) 
The time constraint is: n2i + = 1 (14) 
2.2.1.3 Third period: 
In the third period, all individuals retire and get the regular old age pension (RP) 
from the government, and the individual consumption equals to the saving plus the RP, 
that is: c , ~  = s2 (1 + r) + RP (15) 
Now he retires in full time, therefore: 13i = 1 (16) 
2.2.1.4 Government Budget Constraint: 
Assume that 25% of the population are type L and that 25% are type H. The 
remaining 50% are type M. In wage tax regime, the government's budget constraint is: 
(0.25wLn,,z + 0.5wMn,,,z + 0.25wHn,,z)(l + r)' 
+ (0.25wLn,, + 0 . 5 ~ ~ ~  * n,,, + 0.25wHn,,)Az(l + r) 
= RP 
(17) 
2.2.2 Individual Choice Problem 
MaxU = In(win,, (1 - r) - s, + y Jn(1- n,, ) + p(ln(/lw, n2i  (1 - r )  + s, (1 + r) - s, ) 
+ qi ln(1- n,,)) + pA2(ln(RP + s, (1 + r)) 
i=L,M, and H. 
Maximization of this above equation with respect to n, , and t ~ , ~  sIi  , s,, yields the 
agents' consumption and labour supply functions. The first order conditions of this 
maximization exercise are: 
With respect to nli : 
With respect to n,i 
Where the solutions to this system of equations specify equilibrium labour 
supply: n,*i and n;, , s l i ,  s2,. 
With respect to s , ~  : 
With respect to sZi :
When optimal, c1*; = cii = c;i = c,* 
Where the solutions to this system of equations specify equilibrium labour 
With the equation so indicated, we can construct the indirect utility function, 
CALIBRATION: 
In this paper, there are seven parameters in the model that need to be calibrated. 
The average value of the tax rate, z , is 0.30, which follows from Andolfatto, 
Ferrall and Gomme (2000). This is a standard choice for income tax rate of these 
researches. 
The value q for an average individual is chosen to be 1.4212, which also follows 
Andolfatto, Ferrall and Gomme (2000). The weight being placed on leisure reflects that 
in the data, average individuals spend about one third of their discretionary time in the 
paid labour market and two thirds of their time in leisure activities. This value will be 
considered to be the median value for this sample parameter. The low value is chosen to 
be 1.01068 and the high value 1.8249. 
w is calibrated to match the earnings distribution over three different education 
types: high school dropouts, high school graduates and college graduates. Using the 
data from CANSIM, the college grad earns approximately about 40% higher earnings 
than high school grad. Thereby, this study sets the wage rate for the college grad at 31 
dollars per hour, and for the high school and the drop out at 26 and 17 dollars 
respectively. 
The interest rate r; from CANSIM, it is shown that in the past twenty years, the 
average interest rate in Canada is 2%, which also consistent with Andolfatto, Ferrall and 
Gornrne (2000). The interest rate for 20 years is (1+2%) 20 -1=0.4859. 
Consequently, the discount factor P in this study is 1/(1+2%) 20 =0.6726. 
For working hours, noting that the number of discretionary hours available per 
year is 16*356=5840, for twenty years, the total hours is 5,840*20=116,800. 
With the model so calibrated, one can now examine how the different pension 
systems will influence the labour supply decision of individuals both with 
heterogeneous skills and heterogeneous preference for leisure. 
Following that, this paper will first study a system without pensions, and set 
them as a benchmark. Subsequently, it will examine the result of the pension program 
financed by the flat tax regime. 
4 RESULTS 
The first case simulated is the economy without tax and without a pension 
system. 
Secondly in flat tax regime, with all other assumptions the same is considered. 
When setz # 0, it specifies the program that consists of the wage tax and the pension. 
The result observed by running the GAUSS program is studied as follows: 
4.1 No Pension Plan 
4.1.1 Labour supply 
Individuals maximize their utility over three periods. Without any distortion, in 
the first period the labour supply for the college is 0.49. For the high school and the drop 
out, they are 0.43 and 0.26 respectively. In the second period, the labour supply of the 
college is 0.54, the high school is 0.48 and the drop out is 0.33. The reason that the 
individual prefer to work more in the second period is when they are in the middle age, 
they have higher working skill. Because the wage rate increases, the return for jobs rises 
also. 
4.1.2 Saving 
In both first and second periods, all individuals save money to support 
themselves after retirement in the third period. Because the highest wage rate, the 
college saves most, in the first period, the saving is 2.28, and in the second period, it is 
8.78. The high school is 1.59 and 6.56. The drop out save is just 0.43 and 2.78. 
4.1.3 Utility 
In the current program neither tax nor pension is attainable. Individuals smooth 
consumption and leisure over periods using the private saving. For the college grad, the 
maximum utility he gets is 2.78. The high school is 2.44 and the drop out is 1.25. 
All of this result is illustrated in the table 1. This study sets the outcome of no tax 
as the bench mark. 
4.2 Pension Program 
4.2.1 Labour supply 
When the pension program finances flat tax, the tax people paid in the first 
period is the pension they attain in the third period. Supposing the consumption and 
leisure are normal goods at each date. All three types decrease the labour supply and 
utility compared to no tax regime. First this study sets the tax rate is 0.1. The labour 
supply of the college falls from 0.494 to 0.492 in the first period, and falls from 0.54 to 
0.53 in the second period. The high school decreases from 0.494 to 0.492 in the first 
period and from 0.488 to 0.485 in the second period. Among the three types, the low 
skilled decreases his labour supply most. For the college, he drops by 0.37%and 0.31%, 
he drop out only lowers his labour supply by 1.8% and 1.3 %. 
4.2.2 Saving 
Consistent with individual's labour supply decreasing, all people lower their 
saving before retirement. Less work causes less wealth they can create. The saving of the 
college drops by 14% in the first period and 12% in the second period. But for the drop 
out, he drops by 32% and 18% respectively. He also drops most. For the high school, he 
changes from 1.59 to 1.34 in the first period, and from 6.56 to 5.67 in the second period. 
4.2.3 Utility 
Due to the distortion wage tax, it causes deadweight loss on the economy. All 
three types suffer the utility loss. Set the welfare cost for each type is E ~ .  To get this 
fraction of consumption of each type being willing to pay for having this pension 
program implemented, the calculating procedure is: 
First, get the utility of no pension u; and the utility of pension ui,, . 
Therefore the fraction equals to 
By running the GAUSS code, the fraction is: for the college, it is 0.92; for the high 
school, it is 0.91; for the drop out is 0.90. 
The surprising thing observed is no type has benefited this program, even the 
lowest skilled person. The redistributive effects on the economy have not come into 
view as we supposed to be. 
4.2.4 Changing the tax rate 
4.2.4.1 Labour supply 
Then this study changes the tax rate. One direction is to make it be larger, and 
another is to vary it to be smaller. 
Set the rate is 0.2,0.3, and 0.4, 0.5 and 0.8. This paper examines when the tax rate 
increases, the distortion also rises. Changing tax rate from 0 to 0.5, the labour supply of 
the college turns from 0.49 to 0.47 in the first period; and from 0.54 to 0.52 in the second 
period. For the high school, he varies from 0.43 to 0.41 in the first period and from 0.48 
to 0.46 in the second period; for the drop out also always lowers his labour supply when 
the tax rate rises, changing from 0.26 to 0.22 in the first period, and from 0.33 to 0.29 in 
the second period. All individuals have the same trend that is the higher tax rate, the 
lower the labour supply. When the tax rate is 0.8, for the dropout, he gives up working 
completely. 
If set the rate decreases and change it from 0.1 to 0.05 and to 0.01, the distortion 
of each type's labour supply becomes less. 
When the tax rate is 0.05, for the drop out, his labour supply is 0.2669 in the first 
period, and 0.3353 in the second period; when tax rate decreases to 0.01, his labour 
supply increases to 0.2692 and to 0.3357 respectively. When tax rate is 0.05, for the high 
school, his labour supply is 0.4356 and 0.4869; when at 0.01, the distortion of labour 
supply shrinks, becoming 0.4366 and 0.4878. It is the same with the college grad. 
4.2.4.2 Saving 
Consistent with the decreasing of the labour supply, all individual's savings also 
fall when the tax rate rises. For the college, his saving drops from 0.43 to 0.01, when the 
tax rate varies from 0 to 0.3 in the first period and from 2.78 to 1.23 in the second period. 
When the tax rate is 0.4, the drop out even begin to borrow money in his first period. For 
the high school when the tax rate rises to 0.5, the saving in the first period decreases 
from 1.59 to 0.36, and lowers from 6.56 to 2.19. When the tax rate is 0.8, the high school 
will borrow money before his retirement. For the college, when the tax rate rises to 0.5, 
the saving in the first period drops from 2.2 to 0.7 and from 8.7 to 3.3 in the second 
period. 
4.2.4.3 Utility 
Due to distortion of the flat tax, all individual's utility deteriorates. With higher 
tax rate, the fraction decreases. For the college, when tax rate rises 0.1 to 0.5, the fraction 
becomes from 0.90 to 0.63; for the high school, it changes from 0.91 to 0.64; for the drop 
out, it changes from 0.90 to 0.67. Though each type becomes worse off due to the 
pension when the tax rate rises, the h g h  skilled person is hurt most. Relatively the low 
skilled person's utility lessens least. 
Correspondingly, when the tax rate becomes smaller, the fraction increases. For 
the college, when tax rate decreases from 0.05 to 0.01, E increase from 0.95 to 0.99; for 
the high school, it rises from 0.95 to 0.99; for the drop out, also goes up from 0.96 to 0.99. 
4.2.4.4 Consumption: 
Due to the flat tax, the difference among three types shrinks. When the tax rate is 
zero, the college's consumption is as 2.5 times as that of the drop out and is 33% higher 
than the high school. However when the tax rate is 0.5, the college is as 2.07 times as the 
drop out and is 32% higher than the high school. The higher tax rate brings the smaller 
consumption gap. 
CONCLUSION 
By this study, it shows the fully funded pension program financed by the flat tax 
does not improve social welfare. If it is implemented, both the low skilled and high 
skilled person is worse off. The only difference is the low skilled person is damaged less 
than the high skilled by this program. To maximize utility, individuals can use the 
private saving changes to smooth leisure and consumption over the life cycle. For all 
individual and the whole economy, no tax combined with no pension program is 
optimal in this paper. If this pension program is introduced, because the distortion wage 
tax causes the deadweight loss, it only does harm to all individuals. The results of this 
study call into question the social desirability of a fully-funded pension plan. 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Result tables 
Table 1: Labour supply when tax rate changes. 
Table 2: Saving in the second period: 
11 S21 ' 1 ,  
Table 3: Utility of three types: 
Table 4: Tax rate decreases (t changing from O.lto 0): 
nu 
n21  
SI I
S 2 1  
Pension 
n1 ,, 
n,, 
Table 5 when the tax rate increase, the welfare cost of each type: 
0.2644 
0.3313 
0.2937 
2.2602 
0.3932 
0.4344 
2; ;, 
s , ,  
0.4929 
0.2688 
0.3353 
0.4227 
2.7337 
0.0398 
0.4366 
0.5390 
1.9629 
0.4946 
0.2670 
0.3336 
0.3651 
2.5226 
0.1979 
0.4357 
0.5405 
2.2539 
0.2693 
0.3357 
0.4371 
2.7867 
0.0000 
0.4368 
0.4939 0.4948 
0.5399 
2.1243 
0.5407 
2.2864 
TabIe 6: The welfare cost of each type, when the tax rate decreases: 
Table 7: Consumption of each type when the tax rate increases: 
tax rate 
t=o 
high school 
college 
t=0.1 
3.752 drop out 4.14071 6 
9.761 31 1 
13.051 65 
t=0.2 
3.362 
8.824 
1 1.790 
t=0.3 
2.971 
7.885 
10.526 
t=0.4 
2.578 
t=0.5 
2.1 84 
6.944 
9.261 
6.002 
7.993 
5.056 
6.722 
Appendix 2: Result figures 
Figure 1: The labour supply in the first period: 
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Figure 2: The Labour supply in the second period: 
Labour supply in the second period 
& the college 
-*-the high school 
the drop out 
t=O t=0.1 t=0.2 t=0.3 t=0.4 t=0.5 t=0.8 
tax rate 
Figure 3: Saving in the first period: 
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Figure 4: Saving in the second period: 
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Figure 5: Utility of three types: 
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Figure 6: Social cost of each type when the tax rate increases: 
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Figure 7: Welfare cost of each type when the tax rate decreases: 
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Figure 8: Consumption of each type when the tax rate increases: 
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Appendix 3: Gauss code 
The code for the no pension program in the lump sum tax regime: 
new; 
library nlsys; 
nstar = 0.33; 
Beta =1/1.4859; 
rstar =0.4859; 
theta = 1.1; 
tstar =0.01; 
N = 7; 
wage = zeros (3,l) ; 
psi = zeros (3,l) ; 
utility1 = zeros (1,l) ; 
utilitym = zeros (1,l) ; 
utilityh = zeros (1,l) ; 
cpnll = zeros (1,l) ; 
cpn21 = zeros(1,l); 
cpn31 = zeros(1,l); 
cpnlm = zeros (1,l) ;
cpn2m = zeros(1,l) ; 
cpn3m = zeros (1,l) ;
cpnlh = zeros (1,l) ; 
cpn2h = zeros(1,l); 
cpn3h = zeros (1,l) ;
psi [l] = 3; 
psi[2] = 1.5; 
psi[3] = 1.2; 
output = 1; 
{ x,f,g,h } = ~~s~s(&focl,xO); 
cpnll = wage [ll *x [ll * (1-tstar) - x [31 ; 
cpn21 = theta*wage [l] *x [2] * (1-tstar) + x [3] * (l+rstar) - x [4] ; 
cpn31 = x [4] * (l+rstar) + x[5] ; 
cpnlm = wage [2] *x [6] * (1-tstar) - x [a] ; 
cpn2m = theta*wage [2] *x [7] * (1-tstar) + x [a] * (l+rstar) - x [9] ; 
cpn3m = x [9] * (l+rstar) + x [5] ; 
utilityl = ln(cpnl1) +psi [ll *ln(l-x [l] ) + beta* ( ln(cpn21) + 
psi [ll *ln(l-x[21 ) 
) + betaA2*ln(cpn31) ; 
utilitym = In (cpnlm) +psi [l] *ln(l-x [6] ) + beta* ( In (cpn2m) + 
psi [21 *ln (1-x [71 ) 
) + betaA2*ln(cpn3m); 
utilityh = In (cpnlh) +psi [l] *ln (1-x [lo] ) + beta* ( In (cpn2h) t 
psi [31 *ln(l-x [lll ) 
) + betaA2*ln(cpn3h) ; 
print ; 
" Utility of the dropout: utilityl; 
" Utility of the high school: utilitym; 
'I Utility of the college: It utilityh; 
print ; 
proc focl (x) ; 
local fnl, fn2, fn3, fn4, f n 5 , f n 6 , f n 7 , f n 8 , f n 9 , f n l O r f n l 3 ;  
fnl = (1-tstar) * (wage [ll * ( (1-x[ll ) ) - (wage [l] *x [l] * (1-tstar) -
x [31 ) *psi [ll ; 
fn2 = (1-tstar) *theta*wage [I] * (1-x [2] ) - 
psi [ll * (theta*wage [ll *x [21* (1-tstar) +x [3l* (l+rstar) -x [4] ) ; 
fn3 = (wage [ll *x [ll * (1-tstar) -x [31 ) - (theta*wage [I] *x [2] * (1- 
tstar) +x [31* (l+rstar) -x [4] ) ; 
fn4 = theta*wage [ll *x [21* (1-tstar) +x [3] * (l+rstar) -x [4] - 
x [41 * (l+rstar) - x [5] ; 
fn6 = (1-tstar) * (wage [2] * ( (1-x[6] ) ) ) - (wage [2] *x 
x [81 ) *psi [21 ; 
fn7 = (1-tstar) *theta*wage [2] * ( (1-x [7] ) ) - 
psi [2] * (theta*wage [2] *x [7] * (1-tstar) +x [8] * (l+rstar) 
fn8 = (wage[21*~[61*(l-tstar) -x[8])-(theta*wage 
tstar) +x [8] * (l+rstar) -x [9] ) ; 
fnl0 = (1-tstar) * (wage [3] * ( (1-x[lOI ) ) ) - (wage [3] *x[lO] * (1-tstar) -
x [l21 ) *psi [31 ; 
fnll = (1-tstar) *theta*wage [3] * ( (1-x [Ill ) ) - 
psi [31 * (theta*wage [3] *x [ll] * (1-tstar) +x [I21 * (l+rstar) -x [13] ) ; 
•’1112 = (wage [3] *x [lo] * (1-tstar) -x [l21 ) - (theta*wage [3] *x [ll] * (1- 
tstar) +x [l2] * (l+rstar) -x [I31 ) ; 
•’1113 = theta*wage [31 *x [lll * (1-tstar) +x [l2] * (l+rstar) -x [13] - 
retp ( fnll fn2 1 fn3 
endp ; 
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